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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE CAREER OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
The legal concept of state sovereign immunity has been
controversial since the ratification of the Constitution in
1789. In 1793, the Supreme Court ruled that the states had
no sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment reversed this
ruling about the Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment
itself has also been very controversial. We study the
history and development of sovereign immunity jurisprudence
from the founding of the United States until the present
time.
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THE CAREER OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
MASTER’S THESIS, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
FALL 2007
WILLIAM ANDERSON LABACH
INTRODUCTION
State sovereign immunity is the legal doctrine that
consent is required in order to sue a state. This doctrine
is generally considered by the Courts to be a
constitutional matter. Many legal commentators and several
Supreme Court Justices consider it to be a doctrine of the
common law subject to abolition or modification by the
Congress at any time. This paper will trace the historical
development of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and
its incorporation by the Rehnquist Court in the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. It is the thesis
of this paper that state sovereign immunity is of
constitutional dimension and that it stands on its own as a
constitutional doctrine whether incorporated in the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments or not.
ON CONSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT
For the purposes of this thesis, a government is a
person or a group of persons with an organizational
structure which controls a significant portion of the
1

surface of the Earth generally by military force. We may
refer to this land as Blackacre. The powers of government
are arbitrary and unlimited. As people do not feel
comfortable living in a land with unlimited governmental
powers over them, the powers of government are usually
harnessed by a Constitution. A Constitution limits
governmental power and sets up a structure for government.
The people of Blackacre consider the limitations on the
power of government to be their constitutional rights. The
people benefiting from constitutional rights are generally
referred to as citizens. Not all persons located in
Blackacre are necessarily citizens. Persons in Blackacre
who are not citizens may include visitors, trespassers,
invaders, and persons there for a special purpose.
The Constitution is not a source of laws regulating
relations between people. Laws regulating behavior, in a
government similar to that of the United States, are
determined by a Legislature constituted for that purpose.
The Legislature passes the laws the people of Blackacre
live by. The Legislature enacts tax laws and is solely in
charge of spending funds belonging to the government. The
laws of Blackacre are in full force and effect only there.
Another government, such as Greenacre, may choose to either
2

accept or reject a law of Blackacre. Acceptance of a law of
Blackacre by Greenacre is an act of comity. The laws
of Blackacre are generally interpreted by the branch of
government referred to as the Judiciary. Members of the
Judiciary are Judges.

3

CHAPTER I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION IN 1789
The colonies inherited the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from England where it had been the invariable
rule ever since the reign of King Edward I (1272-1307),
known as “Longshanks.” This doctrine was never a matter of
the common law, that is judge made law 1 , but was a
prerogative of the royal sovereign. The doctrine was
inherited by the colonies, but that is not the basis for
its continued validity in the United States Constitutional
system. Sovereign immunity of the states was included in
the Articles of Confederation, the nation’s first
constitution, in Article II: “Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled.” The Articles of Confederation, ratified in
1781, were never repealed, but were supplanted or
constructively amended 2 by the Constitution. The

1

In the Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States at
pp. 170-171 we find the term “common law” defined as follows: Common
law is the body of judge-made law that was administered in the royal
courts of England (King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Exchequer
Chamber) – in contrast with other bodies of English law administered in
different courts, such as equity, admiralty, canon law, and the
customary law of the borough and manorial courts. William Blackstone
described the common law as the general customary law of the realm as
interpreted by the royal judges, the “living oracles” of the law.
2
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, Lawrence, Kansas: University of
Kansas Press (1985), 279.
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Constitution did not mention sovereign immunity. It thus
did not modify the sovereign immunity of the states.
THE TREATY OF PARIS
The Treaty of Paris ending the Revolutionary War in
1783 provided in Article I:
His Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United
States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free
sovereign and independent states, that he treats with
them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and
successors, relinquishes all claims to the government,
propriety, and territorial rights of the same and
every part thereof. 3
Sovereignty of the states thus became a constitutional
matter due to Article VI, paragraph 2, of the Constitution
which provides that treaties shall be the supreme law of
the land:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The meaning and characteristics of sovereignty in 1783
can be ascertained from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England, which was the preeminent authority on

3

Defining Documents of the United States Web site,
http://www.classbrain.com/artteenst/publish/article_33.shtml.

5

English law for the founding generation. “[T]he law
attributes to the king the attribute of sovereignty or preeminence. ... Hence it is, that no suit can be brought
against the king, even in civil matters, because no court
can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power: authority to try would be
vain and idle, without an authority to redress; and the
sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that
court had power to command the execution of it.” 4
There was a case in Pennsylvania about sovereign
immunity before the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution. The case of Nathan v.
the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1 U.S. 77, 1 Dallas 77 (1781)
concerned an attachment of imported clothing in
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania which belonged to the
Commonwealth of Virginia. The Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania held that Virginia was
immune from the processes of Pennsylvania by virtue of its
sovereign immunity.

4

William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England, Dublin:
Company of Booksellers (1775), 241.
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CHAPTER II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CHISHOLM CASE
The United States Government under the Articles of
Confederation had no taxing power. Instead, it relied on
requisitions paid by the states. The requisition of
1786, for example, was supposed to generate $3.0 million
Dollars from the states but only $663.00 was paid. This
left the United States in an insolvent position. There were
proposals in 1781 and 1783 to allow a 5% tax or impost on
exports but Rhode Island and then Virginia vetoed these in
1781 followed by New York in 1783. In Righteous Anger at
the Wicked States: The Meaning of the Founders’
Constitution, Calvin H. Johnson states his thesis as
follows:
[T]hat the Constitution was a radically nationalizing
vector compellingly explained by the righteous anger
of the Founders at the misdeeds of the states. The
anger explains both key steps in the transformation
and also the strength of the drive for change.
The Founders were angry at the states for their
defaults on the requisitions and for their vetoes of
the federal impost. The Founders believed that the
failure of requisitions was due to evil and shameful
acts by the states. Rhode Island’s veto of the 1781
impost was the “quintessence of villainy.” Rhode
Island was a detestable little corner of the Continent
that injured the United States more than the worth of
the whole state. Both Rhode Island and New York, it
was said at the time, should rest in Hell. 5
The Founders expressed their anger at the states in
5

Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution
(2005), 2 – 3.
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immoderate, even religious terms. “United, we stand,
divided we fall” had been the motto that held together the
drive for independence and made victory possible. The
states were betraying the sacred cause of the United
States. The states had betrayed George Washington’s army at
Valley Forge and they were continuing their betrayal of the
common cause. The action of the states in their defaults of
requisitions and in veto of the impost was sin, disease,
wickedness, and vice, not easily forgiven. 6
John Jay was one of the Peace Commissioners who
negotiated the Treaty of Paris. Article Four of the treaty
provided as follows: “It is agreed that creditors on either
side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery
of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted.” 7 There were other provisions of the
treaty providing relief for Loyalists and persons holding
Revolutionary War debts. According to Sandra Frances
VanBurkleo, “Jay particularly fulminated against the
violations of the Definitive Treaty with Britain and the
compacts supporting Revolutionary War debts. His own
promises underpinned many such agreements. Of greater
moment, however, were national ‘honor, justice, and
6
7

Ibid.
Defining Documents of the United States Web site.
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interest.’ Time and time again, he advocated broader powers
of ‘coercion’ so that administrators and judges might
enforce these ‘most salutary and constitutional objects.’” 8

8

Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honor, Justice, and Interest: John Jay’s
Republican Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench”, 42, in
Scott Douglas Gerber (ed.), Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John
Marshall (1998).
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CHAPTER III. THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT THE STATES HAVE
NO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA (1793)
The states had sovereign immunity at least from 1783
until the present as a constitutional matter and not due to
a common law tradition inherited from England. The issue of
sovereign immunity came up almost immediately in the first
major case decided by the United States Supreme Court,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dallas 419, 1 L.Ed. 440
(1793).
The background facts of the case of Chisholm v.
Georgia are not given in the report of Alexander J. Dallas
at 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dallas 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793). They are
found in Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement by
Doyle Mathis. 9 In 1777 the Executive Council of Georgia
authorized Thomas Stone and Edward Davies of Savannah, as
commissioners of the state, to purchase supplies from
Robert Farquhar, a merchant of Charleston, South Carolina.
They purchased a considerable quantity of merchandise from
Farquhar for which he was to receive $169,613.33 in South
Carolina currency. The date of delivery of the merchandise
was November 3, 1777. On December 2, 1777 Farquhar demanded
payment. Georgia paid Stone and Davies for the merchandise,
however, they became insolvent and never paid Farquhar who
9

Doyle Mathis, “Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement”,
Journal of American History 54 (June 1967), 20-23.

10

died in a maritime accident during January 1784. Alexander
Chisholm became executor of Farquhar’s estate. After
efforts to collect the debt failed, Chisholm filed suit
against the state of Georgia in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Georgia in an unreported case
styled Farquhar’s Executor v. Georgia. Governor Edward
Telfair answered the suit stating that Georgia was:
a free, sovereign and independent State, and that the
said State of Georgia cannot be drawn or compelled
...to answer against the will of the said State of
Georgia, before any Justices of the federal Circuit
Court for the District of Georgia or before any Court
of Law or Equity whatsoever. 10
The case was decided in the October, 1791 term of the
Circuit Court at Augusta, Georgia. James Iredell of the
United States Supreme Court on Circuit and Nathaniel
Pendleton of the United States District Court for Georgia
agreed that Georgia could not be sued by a resident of
South Carolina in the Circuit Court. The case was
dismissed. Chisholm then brought an original action against
Georgia in the Supreme Court of the United States.
In a surprising four to one decision, the Supreme
Court ruled against Georgia and decided the states had no
sovereign immunity. The Justices in the majority were Chief

10

Case File, Records of the United States Circuit Court, District of
Georgia, Case A, Box 1.
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Justice John Jay of New York, John Blair of Virginia,
William Cushing of Massachusetts, and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania. James Iredell of North Carolina wrote a
dissenting opinion.
ON SOVEREIGNTY
The Chisholm case concerns the concept of sovereignty.
The definition of sovereignty we shall use is the standard
one taken from Black’s Law Dictionary:
Sovereignty. The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power by which any independent state is governed;
supreme political authority; ...
The power to do everything in a state without
accountability, - to make laws, to execute and to
apply them, to impose and collect taxes and levy
contributions, to make war or peace, to form treaties
of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and
the like. Story, Const. § 207. 11
In a very deceptive manner, Justices Jay and Wilson
use the concept of “popular sovereignty” in place of
sovereignty in their Chisholm opinions. Popular sovereignty
is a legal fiction and not a form of governmental or
territorial sovereignty at all. Popular sovereignty was
adopted by the Federalists to argue for the ratification of
the Constitution. The concept arose in England to replace
the legal fiction known as the divine right of kings in the

11

Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition,
St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. (1968).

12

reign of King Charles I during the first half of the
Seventeenth Century. Parliament needed a new ideology to
justify placing the authority of the King below that of the
people and its representatives. It did this through a new
fiction that God authorized government through the people
and set the people above their governors. According to this
new idea of popular sovereignty, the people of the nation,
exercising their God-given powers chose a government by
kings in hereditary succession. The fiction of popular
sovereignty strained credulity as much as the fiction of
the divine right of kings. The idea of “the people” is an
abstraction and no authorization of government by God ever
occurred. 12
The notion of popular sovereignty explained the novel
American system of sovereignty split between the federal
government and the states. According to this theory, all
sovereignty was in the people who allotted some to the
federal government, some to the states, and retained some
for themselves. This is the argument developed by James
Wilson and used by the Federalists to explain the
Constitution.
In a debate at the Pennsylvania Ratification

12

Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People, New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, (1988), 56-59.

13

Convention November 24, 1787, James Wilson said “[t]hat the
supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the people,
is in my judgment the great panacea of human politics. It
is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in
its nature, and indefinite in its extent.” 13 On the
tombstones for Wilson at Edenton, North Carolina and Christ
Church in Philadelphia is the quote: "That the Supreme
Power, therefore, should be vested in the People, is, in my
judgment, the great panacea of human politics.” 14 Popular
sovereignty is not a legal doctrine and is not a part of
the law of the United States. It is just political
philosophy.
THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE USUALLY CITED AS INDICATING THE
INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDERS CONCERNING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Several important statements concerning sovereign
immunity were made at the times of the Constitutional
Convention and the subsequent ratifying conventions. These
statements are well known and cited by almost all writers
on the subject.
Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist 81, “It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to

13

John Bach McMaster and Frederick D. Stone (eds.), Pennsylvania and
the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, Philadelphia: Historical Society
of Pennsylvania (1888), 230.
14
Burton Alva Conkle, "The James Wilson Memorial," American Law
Register 55 (1907), 7.
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the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union.
Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
states.” 15
James Madison in the Virginia Ratifying Convention
June 20, 1788 debated the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction of
suits between a state and citizens of another State as
follows: “Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state
and citizens of another state is much objected to, and
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of
individuals to call any state into court. The only
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to
bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before
the federal court. This will give satisfaction to
individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state
may have a claim, being dissatisfied with the state
courts.” 16
John Marshall, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
15
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist
Papers (Clinton Rossiter ed.), New York: Penguin Books USA Inc. (1961),
487-488.
16
Jonathan Elliot (ed.), The Debates in the Several States Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Washington: Printed for
the editor, 4 volumes, (1836), vol. 3, 533.

15

on June 20, 1788 argued similarly about citizen-state
diversity jurisdiction:
With respect to disputes between a state and the
citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been
decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no
gentleman will think that a state will be called at
the bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at
present? Are there not many cases in which the
legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state
is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the
sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The
intent is, to enable states to recover claims of
individuals residing in other states. I contend this
construction is warranted by the words. But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be
defendant -- if an individual cannot proceed to obtain
judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a
state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be
avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state
defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.
If this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to
the system on that account? If an individual has a
just claim against any particular state, is it to be
presumed that, on application to its legislature, he
will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a state
recover any claim from a citizen of another state,
without the establishment of these tribunals? 17
The Rhode Island Ratifying Convention proclaimed that
“It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial
power of the United States, in cases where the state may be
a party, does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to
authorize any suit by any person against a state.” 18 The
Convention sought an amendment “to remove all doubts and
controversies respecting the same.” 19
17
18
19

Ibid, 555-556.
1 Elliot’s Debates, 336.
Ibid.
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The New York Ratifying Convention also made known its
understanding “[t]hat the judicial power of the United
States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not
extend to Criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit
against a state.” 20 The convention proceeded to ratify the
Constitution “[u]nder these impressions, and declaring that
the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and
that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the
said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments
which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution
will receive an early and mature consideration.” 21
The clause concerning citizens-state diversity
jurisdiction was proposed by a Committee of Detail of the
Constitutional Convention consisting of John Rutledge,
Edmund Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham, and
James Wilson. Its inclusion in the Constitution occurred
without debate or discussion among the delegates at large
so far as surviving records indicate.
THE JAY OPINION
John Jay was born December 14, 1745 in New York City
to a wealthy merchant family. He graduated from King’s

20
21

Ibid, 329.
Ibid.
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College (now Columbia University) in 1764. He was an
attorney and served in the Continental Congress. In 1782 he
served as one of the commissioners to draft the peace
treaty with England. He was a nationalist thinker. His
nationalist views led to his rejection as a New York
delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. 22
President Washington appointed Jay the first Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court in 1789.
Chief Justice Jay in his Opinion first considered the
sense in which Georgia is a sovereign state. He ignored the
Articles of Confederation and the Treaty of Paris which
both established governmental sovereignty for Georgia. He
did admit “thirteen sovereignties were considered as
emerged from the principles of the Revolution.” He
declared “at the Revolution the sovereignty devolved on
the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless
the African slaves among us may be so called) and have none
to govern but themselves.” 23 He said sovereign immunity was
based on feudalism which never existed in the United States
and had no application here. He defined sovereignty as “the
right to govern” which was not the definition in general

22

Walter Stahr, John Jay: Founding Father, New York: Hambledon and
London (2005), 245-246.
23
Chisholm v. Georgia, 470-472.
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use. He cleverly substituted the fiction of popular
sovereignty for the legal concept of sovereignty so his
opinion would read as if it made some sense.
Jay was of the opinion that Georgia, by being a party
to the Constitution, consented to be suable by individual
citizens of another state. This argument is based on
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution setting forth
the jurisdiction of the federal courts as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; - to all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; - to controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of
another State - between Citizens of different states,
- between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different states, and between a State
or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and fact, with such
Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
Jay argued for a non-existent principle of judicial
symmetry that if a state can sue an individual then an
individual can sue a state. This is, in fact, a correct
interpretation of Article III, Section 2 of the
19

Constitution cited above as far as jurisdiction is
concerned. The problem with Jay’s argument is that a suit
of an individual against a state for ordinary debt does not
state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to
sovereign immunity. Article III, Section 2 is just a
jurisdictional provision for the federal courts. The
Constitution established the federal Courts as Courts of
limited jurisdiction. This is very confusing to nonlawyers. To get a suit into a federal court one must
establish and prove jurisdiction. Once having established
jurisdiction, one must also have a claim upon which relief
may be granted in order to have a case which will survive
dismissal. Article III, Section 2 does not establish
substantive law making states liable to suit in federal
court for debt. No such substantive law existed. Commenting
on the Chisholm case, Akhil Reed Amar said: “This was a
bold leap. Under the common law of Georgia and South
Carolina – and indeed, of every other state in 1792, it
would appear – no damages lay for a breach of contract by a
state itself. At common law, such a contract, though
morally binding upon a state, was not legally enforceable
against it in a damage suit unless the state itself

20

consented to the suit.” 24
Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General of the United States
and attorney for Chisholm, writing to James Madison,
expressed his not very flattering opinion of Jay’s judicial
abilities as follows: “An opinion which has long been
entertained by others is riveted in my breast concerning
the C.J. He has a nervous and imposing elocution, and
striking lineaments of face, well adapted to his real
character. He is clear, too, in the expression of his
ideas, but that they do not abound on legal subjects has
been proved to my conviction. In two judgments which he
gave last week, one of which was written, there was no
method, no legal principle, no system of reasoning!” 25
Walter Stahr, a biographer of Jay, analyzed Jay’s
Chisholm Opinion as follows:
Its main deficiency, from a modern perspective, is
that it assumed that, if there was jurisdiction, if
the Supreme Court had authority to hear a case against
a state, there was a cause of action, a right to
recover on a private contract with a state. But before
the Constitution it was universally agreed that a
private party could not recover on a contract with a
state. As Hamilton put it in the Federalist,
“contracts between a nation and individuals are only
binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have
24
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no pretensions to a compulsive force.” Jay did not
discuss the source of the right to sue a state in
contract, but it seems he assumed the right was found
in a kind of federal common law, that there was now a
federal cause of action on contracts made by states,
even though there had been none before the
Constitution. 26
VanBurkleo characterized Jay’s Chisholm Opinion as
“curiously wistful” and “nonlegalistic”. 27 She further
discussed his judicial career as follows: “The chief
justice, moreover, has been dismissed as a ‘trifling’
student of domestic law whose court escaped mediocrity
(when it did) largely because James Wilson and other
imaginative associates shared the bench. Again, when
measured against modern standards, such charges seem
plausible. Jay produced no scholarship more extensive than
grand jury charges and brief Federalist essays. His
apprenticeship and private practice were relatively
insubstantial, and his judicial experience in New York
before 1789 was fleeting.” 28 She concluded that scholars may
rightly decide that Jay “was a poor excuse for an appellate
judge.” 29 “Gustavus Myers in his History of the Supreme
Court in the United States (1911), found Jay to be a key
figure in a land-owning combine of colonial aristocrats who
protected the interests of their own class against the
26
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popular rank and file.” 30
Jay “was scarcely disposed to take a narrow or
circumscribed view of the judicial power of the Federal
Government, or an enlarged view of the sovereign claims and
immunities of the States. With Jay, no less than with
Wilson, his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia simply marked
the culmination of, and the opportunity to give public,
judicial, and authoritative expression to, views which had
matured during years of public service and of private
thought on the nature of the Union, and of government and
sovereignty in America.” 31 In Federalist No. 3 he said:
“When once a national government is established, the best
men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also
will generally be appointed to manage it. ... Hence it will
result that the administration, the political counsels, and
the judicial decisions of the national government will be
more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of the
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with
respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect
to us.” 32 Jay’s profoundly nationalist views explain the
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judicial activism he exhibited in Chisholm.
THE BLAIR OPINION
John Blair was born in November 1732 to a wealthy and
politically important family. He graduated from the College
of William and Mary in 1754 and studied law in the Middle
Temple in London. He was a Judge of Virginia’s General
Court, High Court of Chancery, and Court of Appeals. He was
a Virginia delegate to the Constitutional Convention along
with George Washington, Edmund Randolph, James Madison,
George Mason, George Wythe, and James McClurg. Madison
recorded him as making no speeches during the Convention.
He was an original appointee to the United States Supreme
Court in 1789. In his Chisholm opinion he said he would
consider the wording of the Constitution and nothing else.
As the Constitution said nothing about sovereign immunity,
this was not a proper way to reach a correct decision.
Noting that Article III, Section 2 conferred the federal
Courts jurisdiction over states, he reasoned in his brief
opinion that once a state “has agreed to be amenable to the
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that
respect, given up her right of sovereignty.” 33 No mention
was made of popular sovereignty.
33
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Earl Gregg Swem said of Blair: “John Blair ... while
not a man of the first order of ability, was a safe and
conscientious judge. He acted an important part in the
history of the country both before and after the American
revolution.” 34 Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire
remarked on Blair’s retirement in 1795: “I consider him as
a man of good abilities, not indeed a Jay, but far superior
to Cushing, a man of firmness, strict integrity and of
great candour.” 35 Wythe Holt remarked about Blair: “Though
not a strong thinker as a jurist, John Blair did have an
ability to get to the heart of the matter, was an able and
competent judge, and was, first and foremost, sturdily
devoted to his own interests and to the cause of mercantile
and planter republican independence, as later embodied in
the Federalist Party.” 36 It would seem that perhaps Blair
went along with the majority in ruling against Georgia in
order to be a good Federalist.
THE CUSHING OPINION
William Cushing was born March 1, 1732 in Scituate,
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Massachusetts. He was the son and grandson of justices of
the Royal superior Court of Judicature of Massachusetts. He
received an A.B. degree from Harvard in 1751, an M.A. from
Yale in 1753 and an M.A. degree from Harvard in 1754. He
was admitted to the Bar in 1755 and practiced law
thereafter. He served as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and was appointed as one of
the original justices of the United States Supreme Court in
1789.
Cushing reasoned that Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution was supposed to provide a necessary dispute
resolution method for disputes between states and citizens
of other states. He asserted “As controversies between
State and State, and between a state and citizens of
another State, might tend gradually to involve States in
war and bloodshed, a disinterested civil tribunal was
intended to be instituted to decide such controversies and
preserve peace and friendship. Further, if a State is
entitled to justice in a Federal court against a citizen of
another State, why not such citizens against the State,
when the same language equally comprehends both? The rights
of individuals and the justice due to them are as dear and
precious as those of States. Indeed the latter are founded
upon the former, and the great end and object of them must
26

be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else
vain is government.” 37 Cushing relied on the same
nonexistent law of judicial symmetry as Jay. He said, “no
argument of force can be taken from the sovereignty of
states.” He made no argument based on popular sovereignty.
Apparently anticipating some difficulty with the decision
of the case, he commented that, “If the Constitution is
found inconvenient in this or any other particular, it is
well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment.” 38 He
apparently expected some discontent and controversy about
the Court’s decision.
Cushing’s biographer, John D.Cushing, concluded that:
“As a federal jurist, he did little to distinguish himself.
That he brought long and valuable experience to the new
judiciary is incontestable, but that he played a
significant role in shaping the constitution or legal
customs of the nation is doubtful.” 39
THE WILSON OPINION
James Wilson was born into humble circumstances
September 14, 1742 in Carskerdo, Fifeshire, Scotland. He
attended St. Andrews University and then immigrated to
37
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America in 1765 settling in Pennsylvania. He read law under
John Dickinson and began practicing law at Reading,
Pennsylvania in 1767. He was a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention and a Signer of both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In 1789
President Washington appointed him one of the original
justices of the United States Supreme Court. As a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention he was a nationalist. In a
debate at the Convention, according to James Madison’s
Notes, John Dickinson said that “[t]he preservation of the
States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It
will produce that collision between the different
authorities which should be wished for in order to check
each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether,
would be ruinous. He compared the proposed National System
to the Solar System, in which the States were the planets,
and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits.
The Gentleman from Pa. [Mr. Wilson] wished he said to
extinguish these planets.” 40 Early in the Convention Wilson
proposed the establishment of election districts for the
Senate that crossed state lines. 41 He argued in the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that the states were not
40
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sovereign and asserted that “in this country the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power resides in the people at
large.” 42 He considered the people of the United States to
be the group in which sovereignty resided and not the
separate peoples organized as states. 43 “Wilson believed the
United States was one people and not a collection of
divergent interests. He believed the federal government and
the states had distinct powers and the states were mainly
to control local matters. He felt the main danger in the
system was that the states might encroach on federal
powers.
In his Chisholm opinion, Wilson was true to his
strongly held earlier beliefs: “As a citizen, I know the
Government of that state [Georgia] to be republican; and my
short definition of such a Government is, one constructed
on this principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the
body of the people. As a Judge of this Court, I know, and
can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens of
Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union,
as a part of the ‘People of the United States,’ did not
surrender the Supreme or Sovereign Power to that State;
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but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to
themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore,
Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.” 44 Wilson’s definition of
a republican government differs somewhat from the standard
one. A republican government is “a government of the
people; a government by representatives chosen by the
people.” 45 According to Gordon Wood, “By definition it [a
republican government] had no other end than the welfare of
the people: res publica, the public affairs, or the public
good.” 46 Wilson argues that a republican government is one
with popular sovereignty rather than one controlled by
representatives elected by the people.
Wilson, like Jay, believed that sovereignty derived
from feudal principles having no application in the United
States. According to Wilson, “Sovereignty is derived from a
feudal source, and, like many other parts of that system so
degrading to man, still retains its influence over our
sentiments and conduct, though the cause by which that
influence was produced never extended to the American
states.” 47 Wilson did admit that sovereign immunity was the
law in England at least since the reign of King Edward I
44
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(1272-1307). 48
Wilson thought the rights of states were inferior to
the rights of people: “Man, fearfully and wonderfully made,
is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator. A state,
useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior
contrivance of man, and from his native dignity derives all
its acquired importance.” 49 This can only be charitably
characterized as a religious view and is in no sense legal
reasoning or an interpretation of the meaning of the United
States Constitution.
At the beginning of his opinion, Wilson stated that
the Chisholm case was one of “uncommon magnitude. One of
the parties to it is a State; certainly respectable,
claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined is,
whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars
so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States? This question, important in
itself, will depend on others, more important still; and,
may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less
radical than this 'do the people of the United States form
a Nation?'” 50 He answers his question about the United
States forming a Nation as follows: “Whoever considers, in
48
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a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture of
the Constitution, will be satisfied, that the people of the
United States intended to form themselves into a nation for
national purposes. They instituted, for such purposes, a
national Government, complete in all its parts, with powers
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary; and, in all those
powers, extending over the whole nation. Is it congruous,
that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men,
any person natural or artificial, should be permitted to
claim successfully an entire exemption from the
jurisdiction of the national Government? Would not such
claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very
existence as a nation?” 51
Colonel William R. Davie, a member of the
Constitutional Convention and later a Governor of North
Carolina, wrote James Iredell on June 12, 1793 stating his
views concerning Justice Wilson’s opinion in Chisholm: “I
confess I read some of these arguments and particularly
that by Mr. Wilson with astonishment: however, the scope
and propriety of this elaborate production called an
argument, were expressly reserved for the contemplation of
‘a few, a very few comprehensive minds;’ and, perhaps,
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notwithstanding the tawdry ornament and poetical imagery
with which it is loaded and bedizened, it may still be very
‘profound.’ On this I shall give no opinion; but as a law
argument it certainly has the merit of being truly
‘original.’ His definition of the American States as
sovereignties is more like an epic poem than a Judge’s
argument, and we look in vain for legal principles or
logical conclusions. The illustration he has drawn from the
relation of the word subject to the word sovereign, as
contradistinguished from the appellation of citizen as the
correlative of the American Government, is no better than a
contemptible play upon words, like his ‘collection of
original sovereigns:’ indeed, speaking professionally, or
as he says ‘politically and classically,’ this whole
argument of his seems to be the rhapsody of some visionary
theorist and entirely unworthy of my former idea of that
man.” 52 Prof. Clyde E. Jacobs of the University of
California, Davis opined that “because Wilson seized upon
Chisholm v. Georgia as a medium for expounding a strongly
nationalist constitutional philosophy, his opinion is
rather weak in certain technical particulars. Moreover, as
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a state paper, it was at least impolitic; many contemporary
statesmen and politicians read it as an exercise in
judicial usurpation, which called for repudiation.” 53
Jean-Marc Pascal, in his study of Wilson’s ideas,
concluded that “Wilson was not an original thinker”
although he was “an outstanding exponent of the American
system of government and an exemplary spokesman of the
American Enlightenment.” 54
THE IREDELL DISSENTING OPINION
James Iredell was born in Lewes, England October 5,
1751, the oldest of five children of a Bristol merchant. At
the age of 17, he emigrated from England to North Carolina
where he entered the customs service at Edenton. He read
law under Samuel Johnston, later a governor of North
Carolina, and was admitted to the bar in 1770. After the
outbreak of the American Revolution he helped to organize
the North Carolina court system. In 1777, he became a judge
and in 1779 attorney general of North Carolina. His strong
support of the proposed U.S. Constitution helped procure
its adoption by North Carolina. North Carolina was the next
to last of the original thirteen states to ratify the
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Constitution and ratification was accomplished there with
some difficulty. President George Washington nominated
Iredell to the Supreme Court in early 1790, and the Senate
confirmed him two days later.
Judge Iredell observed, in accordance with Section 13
of the judiciary Act of 1789, that the Supreme Court had
concurrent jurisdiction of cases such as Chisholm with the
appropriate state court. 55 Section 34 of the Judiciary Act,
the so-called Rules of Decision Act, provided, “That the
laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply.” 56 This meant the Chisholm case
had to be decided using state law. Georgia followed the
rule of sovereign immunity. Justice Iredell thus found no
law in support of a cause of an action by a citizen of
South Carolina against the state of Georgia for debt in
federal court:

55

Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides in part “That the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and
its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction.”, The Constitution Society Web site,
http://www.constitution.org/uslaw/judiciary_1789.htm.
56
Ibid.

35

[I]t is observable that in instances like this before
the Court, this Court hath a concurrent jurisdiction
only; the present being one of those cases where by
the judicial act this Court hath original but not
exclusive jurisdiction. This Court, therefore, under
that act, can exercise no authority in such instances,
but such authority as from the subject matter of it
may be exercised in some other Court. There are no
Courts with which such a concurrence can be suggested
but the Circuit Courts, or Courts of the different
States. With the former it cannot be, for admitting
that the Constitution is not to have a restrictive
operation, so as to confine all cases in which a State
is a party exclusively to the Supreme Court (an
opinion to which I am strongly inclined), yet there
are no words in the definition of the powers of the
Circuit Court which give a colour to an opinion,
that where a suit is brought against a State by a
citizen of another State, the Circuit Court could
exercise any jurisdiction at all. If they could,
however, such a jurisdiction, by the very terms of
their authority, could be only concurrent with the
Courts of the several States. It follows, therefore,
unquestionably, I think, that looking at the act of
Congress, which I consider is on this occasion the
limit of our authority (whatever further might be
constitutionaly, enacted) we can exercise no authority
in the present instance consistently with the clear
intention of the act, but such as a proper State Court
would have been at least competent to exercise at the
time the act was passed.
If therefore, no new remedy be provided (as plainly is
the case), and consequently we have no other rule to
govern us but the principles of the pre-existent laws,
which must remain in force till superceded by others,
then it is incumbent upon us to enquire, whether
previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which
period, or the period of passing the law, in respect
to the object of this enquiry, is perfectly equal) an
action of the nature like this before the Court could
have been maintained against one of the States in the
Union upon the principles of the common law, which I
have shown to be alone applicable. If it could, I
think it is now maintainable here; If it could not, I
think, as the law stands at present, it is not
maintainable; whatever opinion may be entertained;
36

upon the construction of the Constitution, as to the
power of Congress to authorize such a one. Now I
presume it will not be denied, that in every State in
the Union, previous to the adoption of the
Constitution, the only common law principles in
regard to suits that were in any manner admissible in
respect to claims against the State, were those which
in England apply to claims against the crown; there
being certainly no other principles of the common law
which, previous to the adoption of this Constitution
could, in any manner, or upon any colour apply to the
case of a claim against a State in its own Courts,
where it was solely and completely sovereign in
respect to such cases at least. Whether that remedy
was strictly applicable or not, still I apprehend
there was no other. … It is stated, indeed, in Com.
Dig. 105. That 'until the time of Edward I. the King
might have been sued in all actions as a common
person.' And some authorities are cited for that
position, though it is even there stated as a doubt. 57
Like Justice Wilson, Justice Iredell found sovereign
immunity of the English crown to have been uniformly the
law at least since the reign of King Edward I (1272-1307).
There being no law authorizing citizens to sue states
for debt, Justice Iredell, was of the opinion that
dismissal of the case was required. He analyzed the nature
of the states in our federal system as follows:
A State does not owe its origin to the Government of
the United States, in the highest or in any of its
branches. It was in existence before it. It derives
its authority from the same pure and sacred source as
itself: The voluntary and deliberate choice of the
people. ... A State is altogether exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, or
from any other exterior authority, unless, in the
special instances where the general Government has
power derived from the Constitution itself. ... A
57
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State, though subject in certain specified particulars
to the authority of the Government of the United
States, is in every other respect totally independent
upon it. The people of the State created, the people
of the State can only change, its Constitution. Upon
this power there is no other limitation but that
imposed by the Constitution of the United States; that
it must be of the Republican form. 58
He summarizes the conclusions of his opinion as
follows:
I have now, I think, established the following
particulars. 1st. That the Constitution, so far as it
respects the judicial authority, can only be carried
into effect by acts of the Legislature appointing
Courts, and prescribing their methods of proceeding.
2nd. That Congress has provided no new law in regard
to this case, but expressly referred us to the old.
3rd. That there are no principles of the old law, to
which, we must have recourse, that in any manner
authorise the present suit, either by precedent or by
analogy. The consequence of which, in my opinion,
clearly is, that the suit in question cannot be
maintained. 59
He adds in dicta (a view not required in deciding the
case):
So much, however, has been said on the Constitution,
that it may not be improper to intimate that my
present opinion is strongly against any construction
of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of
money. I think every word in the Constitution may have
its full effect without involving this consequence,
and that nothing but express words, or an
insurmountable implication (neither of which I
consider, can be found in this case) would authorize
the deduction of so high a power. 60
Judge Iredell thus came down on the side of the states
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having sovereign immunity rather than all sovereignty being
only in the people. He did not use the fictitious popular
sovereignty argument. While the opinion of Justice Iredell
may seem like just another dissenting opinion without legal
force, it is very important. The holding in Chisholm v.
Georgia was reversed by the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution. This development made Justice
Iredell’s opinion that of the Court although not in a
strict legal sense. Ordinarily, when a higher court
reverses a case there is a written opinion detailing the
manner in which the lower court was wrong. As Chisholm was
reversed by constitutional amendment, there is no document
revealing just how the court went wrong. This has led to
problems of understanding and interpretation that persist
to this day. In particular, there is an argument about
whether Chisholm was reversed by the Eleventh Amendment
because it was an incorrect interpretation of the
Constitution or whether Chisholm was correct but the people
didn’t want such cases in the federal courts. The speed and
near unanimity with which the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted make it “plain that just about everybody in
Congress agreed the Supreme Court had misread the
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Constitution.” 61 Justice Joseph P. Bradley in his opinion of
the court in the very important case of Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 832 (1890) made
significant use of Judge Iredell’s arguments. Hans
concerned the issue of federal question jurisdiction in
suits against states.
REACTION TO CHISHOLM IN THE NEWSPAPERS
Writing of the Chisholm decision, American lawyer and
historian, Charles Warren, concludes that “Both the Bar and
the public in general appeared entirely unprepared for the
doctrine upheld by the Court; and their surprise was
warranted, when they recalled that the vesting of any such
jurisdiction over sovereign States had been expressly
disclaimed and even resented by the great defenders of the
Constitution, during the days of the contest over its
adoption.” 62
The clause in the Constitution providing for original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of cases between states
and citizens of other States as well as between states and
foreign states, citizens, or subjects could possibly be
referred to as the “Trojan horse clause” as it was
definitively construed by leading Federalists before
61
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ratification not to provide a forum for suits in federal
court against States by citizens of other States and then
after ratification received, in Chisholm, the opposite
interpretation. There was some sentiment that the
Federalists planned this strategy in advance as a way of
abolishing the sovereignty of the States which had not been
possible in the Convention. An unnamed “correspondent” to
the Independent Chronicle, a Boston newspaper, wrote “[the]
novelty of an independent and sovereign state being obliged
to respond in a Court of Justice, consisting, perhaps, of
its own citizens, is not less striking, than the importance
of the consequences which may result from an acquiescence
in this stride of authority. ... When the persons in
opposition to the acceptance of the new Constitution hinged
on the article respecting the Judiciary Department being so
very extensive and alarming as to comprehend even the State
itself, as a party to an action for debt; this was denied
peremptorily by the Federalists, as an absurdity in terms.
But it is now said, that the eloquent and profound
reasoning of the Chief Justice has made that to be right,
which was at first doubtful or improper.” 63
On July 9, 1793, Governor John Hancock issued a
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proclamation calling the Massachusetts legislature, the
General Court, into Special Session to consider the
problems caused by the suit of William Vassal against the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the United States Supreme
Court. On that date Governor Hancock had been served with a
subpoena ordering him to appear before the Supreme Court on
August 5, 1793 to offer a defense to the suit. Governor
Hancock thought the matter was one for the legislature to
consider and make decisions about. Governor Hancock was
seeking a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment
making suits against states by citizens of other states,
foreign states and citizens or subjects thereof, illegal.
According to the Boston Gazette: “The Proclamation of
Governor Hancock, inserted in this Gazette, must excite
serious ideas in those who have from the beginning been
inclined to suspect that the absorption of the State
Governments has long been a matter determined on by certain
influential characters in this country, who are aiming
gradually at monarchy.” 64
The Columbian Centinel, a Boston newspaper, had a
Federalist writer who published a series of articles using
the name “Crito.” Crito identified himself as a lawyer. A
person using the name “Anti-Wizard” responded to an article
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by “Crito” in the Columbian Centinel arguing that the
Federalists were trying to “ram down the throats of
Freemen” a King, Lords, Commons, and a standing army. He
claimed lawyers had used craft and subtlety to introduce
the Trojan horse clause into the Constitution with a view
to reduce the States to corporations. 65
In the Salem Gazette of Salem, Massachusetts, a person
writing under the name “Uncle Toby” and also responding to
Crito had a somewhat similar anti-lawyer view. He claimed
the Norman Conquest was not complete until Norman lawyers
introduced laws reducing slavery to a “system.” He warned
readers not to let American lawyers profit from similar
behavior. 66
Gordon Wood believes the arguments advanced by the
Federalists were contrived for the purpose of causing the
ratification of the Constitution: “Considering the
Federalist desire for a high-toned government filled with
the better sorts of people, there is something decidedly
disingenuous about the democratic radicalism of their
arguments, their continual emphasis on the popular
character of the Constitution, their manipulation of Whig
maxims, their stressing of the representational nature of
65
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all parts of government, including the greatly strengthened
executive and Senate. In effect, they appropriated and
exploited the language that more rightly belonged to their
opponents. The result was a beginning of a hiatus in
American politics between ideology and motives that was
never again closed. By using the most popular and
democratic rhetoric available to explain and justify their
aristocratic system, the Federalists helped to foreclose
the development of an American intellectual tradition in
which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and
genuinely related to differing social interests.” 67
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CHAPTER IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND POST-CHISHOLM
DEVELOPMENTS
New York elected John Jay Governor in May 1795 and
he resigned from the United States Supreme Court to take
that position. President John Adams nominated Jay as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1800 but Jay
declined the nomination due to weak health and the
“fatigues incident to the office.” 68 John Blair resigned
from the Supreme Court October 25, 1795 due to failing
health. William Cushing was a candidate for Governor of
Massachusetts in 1794 and 1795 but was soundly defeated
both times by Samuel Adams. His Chisholm opinion was
unpopular in Massachusetts. President Washington nominated
Cushing to be Chief Justice in 1796 after Alexander
Hamilton, John Rutledge, and Patrick Henry had all declined
the position. Cushing was unanimously confirmed by the
Senate but resigned after serving for only a week due to
ill health. He retained his position as Associate Justice
and served until his death September 13, 1810. James Wilson
aspired to be Chief Justice but was passed over many times.
He died of malaria in Edenton, North Carolina on August 21,
1798 in a state of financial embarrassment due to
unsuccessful land speculation. James Iredell served on the
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Court until his death October 20, 1799. Apparently the
opinions of Jay and Cushing in Chisholm did not harm their
standing with the Federalists as they both received
nominations afterwards to be Chief Justice. One can surmise
that their opinions in Chisholm were consistent with
Federalist ideology.
Two days after the Chisholm decision was announced a
resolution of uncertain authorship was introduced in the
Senate proposing a constitutional amendment abolishing
citizen-state diversity jurisdiction worded as follows:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend
to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” 69
However, the Second Congress adjourned without taking any
action on the matter.
On November 4, 1793, Georgia Governor Edward Telfair
presented to a joint session of the Georgia legislature his
annual message and referred to the recent Chisholm decision
of the United States Supreme Court as follows:
A process from the Supreme Court of the United States
at the instance of Chisolm, executor of Farquhar, has
been served upon me and the attorney-general. I
declined entering any appearance, as this would have
69
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introduced a precedent replete with danger to the
Republic, and would have involved this State in
complicated difficulties, abstracted from the
infractions which it would have made in her retained
sovereignty. The singular predicament to which she has
been reduced by savage inroads has caused an emission
of paper upwards of £150,000 since the close of the
late war, a considerable part of which is still
outstanding, and which in good faith and upon
constitutional principles is the debt of the United
States. I say were action admissible under such
grievous circumstances, an annihilation of her
political existence must follow. To guard against
civil discord as well as the impending danger, permit
me most ardently to request your most serious
attention to the measure of recommending to the
legislatures of the several states that they effect a
remedy in the premises by amendment to the
Constitution; and that to give further weight to this
matter, the delegation of this State in Congress be
requested to urge that body to propose an amendment to
the several legislatures. 70
The Georgia House of Representatives passed a bill
providing the death penalty for any U.S. Marshal attempting
to enforce the Chisholm decision:
That any Federal Marshal, or any other person or
persons levying or attempting to levy on the territory
of this state or any part thereof, or on the treasury
or any other property of the Governor or Attorney
General, or any of the people thereof, under or by
virtue of any execution or other compulsory process
issuing out of, or by authority of the supreme court
of the United States, as it now stands, be
constituted; for, or in behalf of the before-mentioned
Alexander Chisholm, executor of Robert Farquhar, or
for, or in behalf of any other person or persons
whatsoever, for the payment or recovery of any debt or
pretended debt, or claim against the state of Georgia;
shall be, and or they attempting to levy as aforesaid,
70
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are hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and shall
suffer death, without benefit of the clergy, by being
hanged. 71
This bill did not pass in the Georgia Senate probably due
to favorable prospects for a constitutional amendment
nullifying the Chisholm decision.
On January 2, 1794 a Senator, now unknown, introduced
a resolution proposing the exact text of the Eleventh
Amendment in the United States Senate reading as follows:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens of
subjects of a foreign State. 72
This proposed amendment eliminated citizen-state diversity
jurisdiction in cases involving suits against states by
citizens of other states and citizens and subjects of
foreign states as well as prohibiting the Courts from
construing the judicial power of the United States in such
a way as to permit a Chisholm type suit. The wording of the
proposed amendment clearly conveyed a lack of confidence in
the ability and/or willingness of judges to correctly
interpret the Constitution. Such an amendment eliminated
problems like Chisholm in the future but failed to
specifically resolve or clarify the underlying question of
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state sovereign immunity. This left an unfortunate
ambiguity in constitutional law.
A two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress
proposed the Eleventh Amendment, which was one of the
methods for proposing an amendment. Ratification of the
proposed Eleventh Amendment required the approval of
the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. By
February 7, 1795 the required number of states had ratified
the Eleventh Amendment. 73 However, the Presidential
proclamation of ratification did not occur until January 8,
1798. 74 On February 14, 1798 the Supreme Court decided
unanimously that “there could not be exercised any
jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state
was sued by the citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state,” Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 1 L.Ed. 644, 3 Dallas 378 (1798). 75
While the language of the Eleventh Amendment seems at
first blush to be simple and clear enough, the amendment
has been subjected to many different and contradictory
interpretations by commentators and the Courts.
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No further reported cases against states invoking the
sovereign immunity defense appeared in the Supreme Court
until 1890 when a very important case involving Louisiana
bonds came before it.
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CHAPTER V. HANS V. LOUISIANA AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
In 1890, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
state sovereign immunity. Bernard Hans, a citizen of
Louisiana, sued the state to pay the coupons on some
defaulted state bonds he was holding. He also alleged that
Louisiana had violated the Constitution by impairing the
obligation of a contract. This created a federal issue. 76
The Eleventh Amendment did not apply in this case as there
was no citizen-state diversity jurisdiction. The Circuit
Court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction, Hans
v. State of Louisiana, 24 F. 55 (E.D., Louisiana, 1885).
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 832 (1890),
decided Louisiana had no liability due to sovereign
immunity. Justice Bradley, writing the opinion of the
Court said:
The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions
unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not
contemplated by the constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States. Some things,
undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were not
known as such at the common law; such, for example,
as controversies between states as to boundary lines,
and other questions admitting of judicial solution.
... The suability of a state, without its consent, was
a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often
laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that
76
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it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted. It was
fully shown by an exhaustive examination of the old
law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm
v. Georgia; and it has been conceded in every case
since, where the question has, in any way, been
presented. ...
But besides the presumption that no anomalous and
unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be
raised up by the Constitution -- anomalous and unheard
of when the Constitution was adopted – an additional
reason why the jurisdiction claimed for the Circuit
Court does not exist, is the language of the act of
Congress by which its jurisdiction is conferred. The
words are these: "The circuit courts of the United
States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with
the courts of the several States, of all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity, . . . arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or treaties," etc. -- "Concurrent with the courts of
the several States." Does not this qualification show
that Congress, in legislating to carry the
Constitution into effect, did not intend to invest its
courts with any new and strange jurisdictions? The
state courts have no power to entertain suits by
individuals against a State without its consent. Then
how does the Circuit Court, having only concurrent
jurisdiction, acquire any such power? It is true that
the same qualification existed in the judiciary act of
1789, which was before the court in Chisholm v.
Georgia, and the majority of the court did not think
that it was sufficient to limit the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court. Justice Iredell thought
differently. In view of the manner in which that
decision was received by the country, the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the
reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to
prefer Justice Iredell's views in this regard. 77
Justice Bradley’s opinion was very similar to that of
Justice Iredell in Chisholm. He observed that a cause of
action by an individual against a state for debt was
unknown before Chisholm. The state and federal courts
77
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exercised concurrent jurisdiction over such actions which
meant that the law would be the same in both courts. No
state allowed such suits. As pointed out by Justice
Bradley, the Eleventh Amendment “expressing the will of the
ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all
legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision
of the supreme court [in Chisholm].” 78 Justice Bradley was
rated in The First One Hundred Justices as one of the “near
great” justices of the Supreme Court. 79
The Hans case has encountered much criticism due to
its use in barring federal question suits against states.
Although the Eleventh Amendment had no application in Hans,
the case law later interpreted it as an Eleventh Amendment
case. In fact, Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag, asserts that
Hans is “the seminal Eleventh Amendment case, the case from
which all significant Eleventh Amendment doctrine now
flows, and to which both supporters and critics of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence look to begin their discussion.” 80
One recent book criticizing Hans is Narrowing the
Nation’s Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the States by
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John T. Noonan, Jr. The author is a former law professor
and judge of the United States Court of Appeals. He has his
character Clio say: “As a matter of fact, there is a
constitution that Joseph Bradley and his companions in Hans
might have been expounding. It’s called the Constitution of
the Confederate States of America, adopted March 11,
1861.” 81 More seriously, Noonan argues that sovereign
immunity is a common law doctrine that Marshall, Madison,
and Hamilton probably believed to be in force. He argues
that Chief Justice John Marshall held that the states
waived sovereign immunity as to federal questions
when they ratified the constitution, citing as his
authority Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). Cohens was
an appeal of Virginia criminal convictions to the United
States Supreme Court. The brothers Cohen were convicted of
unlawfully selling lottery tickets for the National Lottery
in the state of Virginia. It was argued without success
that appellate jurisdiction in such a case was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment or was otherwise outside the
judicial power of the United States. The Eleventh Amendment
refers to “any suit in law or equity, commenced or
81
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prosecuted against one of the United States.” An appeal is
the continuation of an already existing case and not a new
suit being commenced or prosecuted. Justice Marshall ruled
that the appeal in Cohens was not a suit in law or equity
commenced or prosecuted against Virginia within the meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment. He compared the case to appeals
against the United States: “The point of view in which this
writ of error, with its citation, has been considered
uniformly in the Courts of the Union, has been well
illustrated by a reference to the course of this Court in
suits instituted by the United States. The universally
received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary
act does not authorize such suits. Yet writs of error,
accompanied with citations, have uniformly issued for the
removal of judgments in favour of the United States into a
superior Court, where they have, like those in favour of an
individual, been re-examined, and affirmed or reversed. It
has never been suggested, that such writ of error was a
suit against the United States, and, therefore, not within
the jurisdiction of the appellate Court.” 82 The Cohens
appeal was not a suit against Virginia to which the
82
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Eleventh Amendment might have some arguable application.
The constitutional basis for the Cohens appeal was not
original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution but Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. 83
Justice Marshall made no ruling in Cohens that
the states waived objection to federal question
jurisdiction by ratifying the Constitution or joining the
Union.
Likewise, Alexander Hamilton never opined that the
states waived objection to federal question jurisdiction by
ratifying the constitution. Noonan refers to Federalist No.
80 where Hamilton writes about restrictions on state power
in the constitution such as imposing duties on imported
articles and emission of paper money. He states that some
enforcement power is implied and that this “power must
either be a direct negative on the State laws, or an
83

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads in relevant part as
follows: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between
two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.

56

authority in the federal courts to overrule such as might
be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union. ...
The latter appears to have been thought by the convention
preferable to the former.” 84 Hamilton made his opinion about
sovereign immunity clear in Federalist No. 81: “It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union.
Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
states.” 85 The general remarks of Federalist 80 are
sharpened by the more specific remarks in Federalist 81 and
make clear Hamilton’s unambiguous opinion.
Noonan admits that James Madison never made an
argument that the states waived objection to federal
question jurisdiction. His argument that Hans was wrongly
decided will not hold water.
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CHAPTER VI. POST-HANS CASES INVOLVING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In 1900, the Supreme Court decided another case
involving the issue of sovereign immunity. In this case, a
corporation chartered by an Act of Congress sued the
Treasurer of California in his official capacity.
SMITH V. REEVES
In Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44
L.Ed. 1140 (1900), the Receivers of the Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation created by an 1866
Act of Congress, brought suit against the Treasurer of
California in his official capacity for a recovery of taxes
paid. The Court regarded this suit as one against the state
of California. Such a suit did not fall within the ambit
of the Eleventh Amendment as the railroad company was not a
citizen of a state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing for a
unanimous Court, declared that, “[t]he present plaintiffs,
as did the plaintiffs in Hans v. Louisiana, base the
argument in support of their right to sue the State in the
Circuit Court upon the mere letter of the Constitution. We
deem it unnecessary to repeat or enlarge upon the reasons
given in Hans v. Louisiana why a suit brought against a
State by one of its citizens was excluded from the judicial
58

power of the United States, even it is one arising under
the Constitution and Laws of the United States. They apply
equally to a suit of that character brought against the
State by a corporation created by Congress.” 86 The case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Justice Harlan had
written a concurring opinion in Hans stating that Chisholm,
in his view, was decided correctly in 1793 based on the law
in effect at that time. Justice Harlan was one of the
twelve justices receiving a rating of “great” in The First
One Hundred Justices. 87
The Supreme Court also ruled that sovereign immunity
applied to suits in admiralty against states whether in
personum or in rem. In 1921 two such suits came before the
Court for decision.
EX PARTE NEW YORK, NO. 1
The case of Ex Parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490; 41
S.Ct. 588; 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) was an admiralty suit
against the state of New York. An admiralty case is a case,
civil or criminal, resulting from maritime contracts,
torts, injuries, and offenses done upon or relating to the
sea, navigable streams running into the sea, and the Great
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Lakes. The Eleventh Amendment did not apply as it only
applies to suits “in law and equity.” This case involved
damages to vessels on the Erie canal caused by tugboats
and sought in personum relief. In personum relief is money
damages. Justice Mahlon Pitney delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court saying, “That a state may not be sued
without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence
having so important a bearing upon the construction of the
Constitution of the United States that it has become
established by repeated decisions of this court that the
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private
parties against a state without consent given.” 88
EX PARTE NEW YORK, NO. 2
The case of Ex Parte New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503; 41
S.Ct. 592; 65 L.Ed. 1063 (1921) was an action against the
steam tug Queen City involving a drowning on the Erie canal
allegedly caused by the negligent operation of the tug. The
suit sought in rem relief. That is, the suit sought the
seizure and sale of the Queen City. An in rem suit is one
against property in contradistinction to personal actions
for money damages. The Queen City was the property of the
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state of New York. Justice Pitney ruled in favor of New
York noting that permitting a creditor to seize and sell
government property “to collect his debt would be to
permit him in some degree to destroy the government
itself." 89 The Court ruled the Queen City exempt from
seizure by admiralty process in rem due to its ownership by
the state of New York.
In 1934 a suit was brought against Mississippi by the
Principality of Monaco on some old defaulted state bonds.
The Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit this suit.
MONACO v. MISSISSIPPI
Another unsuccessful attempt was made to pierce the
sovereign immunity of the states in the case of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313; 54 S.Ct. 745; 78 L.Ed. 1282
(1934). Several holders of seventy year old unpaid
Mississippi bonds donated them to the Principality of
Monaco, which was to use them for charitable purposes.
Monaco then attempted to sue Mississippi to force payment
on the bonds in the Supreme Court of the United States
pursuant to the clause in Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution providing for jurisdiction in the case of
suits “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
89
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foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”. The Eleventh
Amendment did not apply in this case as Monaco was a
foreign state rather than a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. A unanimous Court in an opinion by Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes ruled that an action such as that of
Monaco was impossible without the consent of the parties
and denied leave to file the suit. Chief Justice Hughes was
one of the twelve justices rated as “great” in The First
One Hundred Justices. 90
This case was somewhat like Chisholm in that there was
a jurisdictional statute permitting the suit, but no
justiciable cause of action. Chief Justice Hughes ruled
that “States of the Union, still possessing attributes of
sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their
consent, save where there has been ‘a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention.’ The Federalist,
No. 81.” 91 This language of Chief Justice Hughes occurs in
later cases about sovereign immunity. In considering the
plan of the convention, the Court cited remarks of James
Madison in the Virginia Ratifying Convention in which he
stated: “The next case provides for disputes between a
foreign state and one of our states, should such a case
90
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ever arise; and between a citizen and a foreign citizen or
subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be
decided, in these courts, between an American state and a
foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they
consent, provision is here made.” 92 John Marshall expressed
similar views in the Virginia Ratifying Convention. 93
Another issue concerning the Eleventh Amendment was
whether Congress had authority to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states by statute. At first it
was thought by many that Congress could do this. The first
successful abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
was against the state of Alabama.
PARDEN V. TERMINAL RAILWAY OF ALABAMA
Citizens of Alabama sued a railway owned by Alabama in
the United States District Court to recover damages under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for injuries sustained
while working for the railway. The federal statute
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of Alabama. At
issue was whether this statute was constitutional. The
Supreme Court ruled it was in a five to four decision in an
opinion by Justice William Joseph Brennan, Jr. joined by
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Justices Warren, Black, Clark, and Goldberg. Justice White
dissented joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart.
Justice Brennan was the leader of the liberals on the Court
during his tenure from 1956 until 1990. He stated:
“Recognition of the congressional power to render a state
suable under the FELA does not mean the immunity doctrine,
as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to
citizens of other States and as extended to the State’s own
citizens by the Hans case, is here being overridden. It
remains the law that a state may not be sued by an
individual without its consent. Our conclusion is simply
that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate
railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the
FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as is authorized
by that Act.” 94 The dissent argued that abrogation was a
matter for the Congress instead of the Court. If Congress
decided to condition privileges within its control on the
forfeiture of constitutional rights “its intention to do so
should appear with unmistakable clarity.” 95
The rationale of the Parden dissenters came to be the
majority view in our next case. 96
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EMPLOYEES OF DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE OF MISSOURI
V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
This was a suit by employees of Missouri state
agencies to recover overtime compensation due under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion
of the Court joined by Justices Burger, White, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. He ruled that Missouri could not be
sued under the FELA unless Congress indicated “in some way
by clear language that the constitutional immunity was
swept away.” 97 The Court dismissed the case.
Justice Marshall concurred in a separate opinion
joined by Justice Stewart. He opined that “common law”
sovereign immunity was not a bar and the FLSA did
effectively lift the state’s immunity from private suit. He
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as barring the suit: “On
its face the Amendment, of course, makes no mention of a
citizen's attempt to sue his own State in federal court,
the situation with which we deal here. Nevertheless, I
believe it clear that the judicial power of the United
States does not extend to suits such as this, absent
consent by the State to the exercise of such power.” 98
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Justice Marshall suggested that the employees might seek
relief in the state courts of Missouri: “This is not to
say, however, that petitioners are without a forum in which
personally to seek redress against the State. n12 Section
16 (b)'s authorization for employee suits to be brought ‘in
any court of competent jurisdiction’ includes state as well
as federal courts. ... [S]ince federal law stands as the
supreme law of the land, the State's courts are obliged to
enforce it, even if it conflicts with state policy.” 99
Justice Brennan dissented. He viewed the Eleventh
Amendment differently from the other members of the Court.
He said any “statement that we may infer from the Eleventh
Amendment a ‘constitutional immunity,’ ante, at 285,
protecting States from § 16 (b) suits brought in federal
court by its own citizens, must be rejected. I emphatically
question, as I develop later, that sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation upon the federal judicial power
to entertain suits against States. Indeed, despite some
assumptions in opinions of this Court, I know of no
concrete evidence that the framers of the Amendment
thought, let alone intended, that even the Amendment would
ensconce the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On its face,
the Amendment says nothing about sovereign immunity but
99
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enacts an express limitation upon federal judicial power.”
His view was that Congress validly exercised its authority
under the Commerce Clause and a “common-law shield of
sovereign immunity” was no defense. 100 He said the trend
since Hans was against enforcement of governmental immunity
“except when clearly required by explicit textual
prohibitions, as in the Eleventh Amendment” 101
In 1985 the validity of the Hans doctrine was
questioned in the Supreme Court for the first time after
being the law in numerous cases for ninety-five years.
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed. 2d 171 (1985), a disappointed job
applicant alleging handicap discrimination sued a state
hospital and the California Department of Mental Health in
United States District Court. The District Court dismissed
the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court. The Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals. The majority opinion by
Justice Powell joined by Justices Burger, White, Rehnquist,
and O’Connor held that the suit was proscribed by the

100
101

Ibid., 323.
Ibid, 290-291.

67

Eleventh Amendment as the Rehabilitation Act fell short of
expressing unequivocal intent to abrogate California’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity. In his dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, Justice
Brennan attacked the precedent of Hans v. Louisiana arguing
that the case rested on “misconceived history and misguided
logic.” He viewed sovereign immunity as “an anachronistic
and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal system.” 102 He
argued that the federal question jurisdiction in the
federal courts under Article III is as broad as the
lawmaking authority of Congress. The Brennan dissent
initiated a major controversy between liberals and
conservatives which continues still. Judge Brennan’s views
reflected those of most academicians.
In the next case, the Supreme Court split four to four
over whether to overrule Hans.
WELCH v. TEXAS DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public
Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d
389 (1987) was a case in which an employee of the Texas
state highway and public transportation department was
injured while working on a state-operated ferry dock. She
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filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas against the department and the
state under a federal statute that applied the remedial
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
(45 USCS 51 et seq.) to seamen and provided that any seaman
who suffered personal injury in the course of his or her
employment could maintain an action for damages at law in
federal court. The District Court dismissed the action as
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals
affirmed and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals ruling that the Eleventh Amendment barred in
personum suits in admiralty against unconsenting states
brought by private citizens and the general language of the
federal statute was insufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of Texas. To the extent that Parden was
inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity must be in unmistakably clear
language, it was overruled. Interestingly, the Court stated
in note 14 that “the principle that States cannot be sued
without their consent is broadly consistent with the Tenth
Amendment.” This foreshadowed the Court’s later ruling in
Alden that sovereign immunity was embedded in the Tenth
Amendment.
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The Court split four to four on whether to overrule
Hans with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
being in favor of overruling the case. They quote Professor
John V. Orth of the University of North Carolina School of
Law as follows: "By the late twentieth century the law of
the Eleventh Amendment exhibited a baffling complexity. …
'The case law of the eleventh amendment is replete with
historical anomalies, internal inconsistencies, and
senseless distinctions.' Marked by its history as were few
other branches of constitutional law, interpretation of the
Amendment has become an arcane specialty of lawyers and
federal judges." 103
The next case is the last Supreme Court case before
Seminole Tribe in which an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity received judicial approval.
PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS CO.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct.
2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) was an environmental
“superfund” case against Union Gas Co. to recover the
cleanup costs of coal tar pollution of a creek in
Pennsylvania. Union Gas Co. filed a third party complaint
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which it alleged
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was responsible for some of the cleanup cost. In a
complicated decision, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and Scalia decided the statutory scheme allowed
a suit for money damages in federal court against
Pennsylvania. This raised the issue as to whether Congress
had the authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of
Pennsylvania. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and White ruled that Congress did have such
authority when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Justice White did not favor overruling Hans, however. In
1996, Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas.
The next case concerns a suit by an Alaskan native
village against the state of Alaska. This type of suit is
not prohibited by the language of the Eleventh Amendment
due to no diversity of citizenship.
BLATCHFORD V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF NOATAK
In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991), an Alaskan
native village sued the state of Alaska in a dispute over
annual revenue-sharing payments. The Supreme Court in an
Opinion by Justice Scalia joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter held the suit barred
by the sovereign immunity of the state of Alaska. Justice
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Blackman filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens.
Justice Scalia expounds the judicial views which are
the very heart of the so-called federalism revolution of
the Rehnquist Court in the following lengthy quote:
“Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L. Ed. 842, 10 S. Ct. 504
(1890), we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which
it confirms: that the States entered the federal
system with their sovereignty intact; that the
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this
sovereignty, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and
Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472, 97 L. Ed. 2d
389, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987)(plurality opinion);
Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo.
v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411
U.S. 279, 290-294, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251, 93 S. Ct. 1614
(1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result); and that
a State will therefore not be subject to suit in
federal court unless it has consented to suit, either
expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’ See Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299,
304, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990); Welch,
supra, at 474 (plurality opinion); Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 87 L. Ed. 2d
171, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 79 L. Ed.
2d 67, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).” 104
He thus announces the new approach of the conservatives on
the Rehnquist Court to sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment. The later cases are not much of a surprise after
reading this one carefully. Although Justice Scalia is the
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great literalist of the Court, he abandoned the plain
meaning of the text approach to interpreting Eleventh
Amendment in Blatchford and instead he gave it a meaning
completely outside its text but within the context of its
historical meaning as overruling Chisholm. The Eleventh
Amendment now means the states entered the Union with their
sovereignty intact, that they now have sovereign immunity,
and no abrogation of that immunity of a state by Congress
will be sustained unless the state expressly waived
sovereign immunity or a waiver by the states was made
within the “plan of the Convention.” This approach to the
Eleventh Amendment is now the law of the United States.
The Indians argued that the traditional principles of
immunity set forth in Hans did not apply to suits by
sovereigns like Indian tribes and even if they did, the
states consented to suits by tribes in the "plan of the
convention." The Court found these arguments to be without
merit. The dissent found the Indians to have a valid
federal cause of action.
The following case is a suit by the Seminole Tribe
against the state of Florida. The Eleventh Amendment does
not apply as there is no diversity of citizenship.
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SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA
The sovereign immunity of states was revisited by the
Rehnquist Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44;
116 S.Ct. 1114; 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) in which the
Seminole Tribe of Florida sued Florida and its Governor
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C)(part of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause) to compel good faith negotiations to form
a Tribal-State compact concerning gaming. Such a suit was
provided for by the Act. Florida defended based on
sovereign immunity. At issue was whether the Congress could
abrogate Florida’s immunity from suit. The Court sharply
divided on this issue and in a five to four decision upheld
the sovereign immunity (referred to as Eleventh Amendment
immunity) of the State. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court joined by Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Souter filed a lengthy
dissenting opinion with historical commentary joined
by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. The Court held that
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity was impossible in
enforcing any clause in the Constitution earlier than the
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Fourteenth Amendment. 105 The Court interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment as including state sovereign immunity following
Blatchford: “Although the text of the Amendment would
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779,
115 L. Ed. 2d 686, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).” 106 The Court
overruled Union Gas: “both the result in Union Gas and the
plurality rationale depart from our established
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the
accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude
that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be,
and now is, overruled.” 107 The majority comments on the
dissent as follows: “The dissent, to the contrary,
disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled
together from law review articles and its own version of
historical events. The dissent cites not a single decision
since Hans (other than Union Gas) that supports its view of
state sovereign immunity, instead relying upon the nowdiscredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2
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Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793). See, e.g., post, at 53, n.
47. Its undocumented and highly speculative extralegal
explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the
Court's traditional method of adjudication.” 108
The dissent of Justice Stevens characterized state
sovereign immunity as a matter of federal common law
modifiable by Congress at its pleasure. 109 In an eighty-five
page dissent joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
Justice Souter asserted that the majority decision suffered
from three critical errors: a misreading of the Eleventh
Amendment, a misunderstanding of how common law doctrines
were received at the Founding, and a misunderstanding of
the “nature of sovereignty in the young Republic.” 110
Justice Souter argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply to federal question cases, that the states at the
founding only had a common law sovereign immunity, and the
founders were reluctant to constitutionalize common law
doctrines. Justice Souter’s dissent displays a very
different legal philosophy from his concurrence in
Blatchford five years earlier.
Following Seminole Tribe was the famous case of Alden
v. Maine in which Justice Marshall’s recommendation in
108
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Employees to file federal question cases against states in
state court was tested.
ALDEN V. MAINE
In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706; 119 S.Ct. 2240; 144
L.Ed.2d 636(1999), the plaintiff sued his employer, the
State of Maine, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
in a state court in Maine as authorized by the federal Act.
This suit was not prohibited under the literal terms of the
Eleventh Amendment. The State of Maine asserted its
sovereign immunity as a defense. The Supreme Court in a
five to four decision ruled in favor of Maine in an opinion
by Justice Anthony McLeod Kennedy joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas. Justice Souter
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. The Court held that Congress could
not abrogate the sovereign immunity of a state by Article I
legislation. Justice Kennedy explained state immunity from
suit in the following words: “The Eleventh Amendment makes
explicit reference to the States' immunity from suits
‘commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 11. We have, as a
result, sometimes referred to the States' immunity from
77

suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ The phrase is
convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor
is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather,
as the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the
States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain
today (either literally or by virtue of their admission
into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States)
except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.” 111 He argued that the framers
chose a Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate
individuals but not states. The states under the
Constitution had a “residual and inviolable sovereignty.” 112
The Eleventh Amendment did not change the Constitution, but
merely overruled the erroneous decision of the Supreme
Court in Chisholm and restored the original constitutional
design. “By its terms, then, the Eleventh Amendment did not
redefine the federal judicial power but instead overruled
the Court.” 113 The Article I powers of Congress did not
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include the authority to subject the states to private
suits as an enforcement method in either state or federal
court. Although Parden and Union Gas held state immunity
could be abrogated by Congress, those cases were wrongly
decided and were previously overruled.
The Alden majority ruled for the first time that the
sovereign immunity of the states was encompassed by the
Tenth Amendment. “Any doubt regarding the constitutional
role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the
Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns
about the extent of the national power. The Amendment
confirms the promise implicit in the original document:
‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’
U.S. Const., Amdt. 10.” 114
Justice Souter dissented joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Souter asserted that “There
is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized
a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in the notion
of statehood, and no evidence that any concept of inherent
113
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sovereign immunity was understood historically to apply
when the sovereign sued was not the font of the law.” He
argued that natural law was the basis of the Court’s
acceptance of state sovereign immunity 115 : “The Court’s
principal rationale for today’s result, then, turns on
history: was the natural law conception of sovereign
immunity as inherent in any notion of an independent State
widely held in the United States in the period preceding
the ratification of 1788 (or the adoption of the Tenth
Amendment in 1791? The answer is certainly no.” 116
Justice Kennedy responded to the argument that he was
making use of natural law in the following manner: “Despite
the dissent's assertion to the contrary, the fact that a
right is not defeasible by statute means only that it is
protected by the Constitution, not that it derives from
natural law. Whether the dissent's attribution of our
115
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reasoning and conclusions to natural law results from
analytical confusion or rhetorical device, it is simply
inaccurate. We do not contend the founders could not have
stripped the States of sovereign immunity and granted
Congress power to subject them to private suit but
only that they did not do so. By the same token, the
contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the
founders' understanding, not by the principles or
limitations derived from natural law.” 117
The next case is one concerning the applicability of
the Eleventh Amendment in the context of administrative
law.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION V. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS
AUTHORITY
In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports
Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962
(2002) the Rehnquist Court considered a controversy
concerning South Carolina’s port authority which had denied
a cruise ship permission to berth in Charleston, South
Carolina because its primary business was gambling.
This was a case of first impression as to whether state
sovereign immunity applied in administrative proceedings.
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The Supreme Court in a five to four decision held that it
did in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas joined by
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
The founders did not contemplate the huge federal
bureaucracy that later developed. There are no provisions
in the Constitution relating to the issue of sovereign
immunity in administrative proceedings. Administrative
cases are not judicial proceedings but can be termed quasijudicial proceedings. Justice Thomas quoted Hans as ruling
that the Constitution was not intended to “raise up” cases
against states that were “anomalous and unheard of when the
Constitution was adopted.” 118 He believed there was great
significance in the fact that there were no private suits
in administrative proceedings at the time of the founding
or for many years thereafter. The earliest such case found
in the briefs filed with the Court did not occur until
1918. The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) had authority
to order payment to an injured private party. If its order
was not obeyed it could assess a civil penalty against
South Carolina of up to $25,000.00 per day. The orders of
the FMC were enforceable in United States District Court
in proceedings in which state sovereign immunity was not a
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defense. The Supreme Court dismissed the case stating:
“Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion
on state sovereignty at issue in today’s case, we are
nonetheless confident that it is contrary to the
constitutional design.” 119
Justice Stevens dissented arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment restricted the courts’ diversity jurisdiction but
left intact the holding in Chisholm that the Court had
personal jurisdiction over Georgia. Justice Breyer
dissented joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
stating, “The Court holds that a private person cannot
bring a complaint against a State to a federal
administrative agency where the agency (1) will use an
internal adjudicative process to decide if the complaint is
well founded, and (2) if so, proceed to court to enforce
the law. Where does the Constitution contain the principle
of law that the Court enunciates? I cannot find the answer
to this question in any text, in any tradition, or in
any relevant purpose.” 120 Justice Breyer felt the federalism
decisions of the Rehnquist Court unduly restricted
relationships between citizens and states and said:
“Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued
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dissent.” 121
In the next case, the Court again found an instance in
which the sovereign immunity of the states could be
abrogated by Article I legislation.
CENTRAL VA. COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. KATZ
Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
126 S.Ct. 990, 163 L.Ed.2d 945 (2006) concerned a
preferential transfer claim by the Bankruptcy Trustee for
Wallace’s Bookstores, Inc. against Central Virginia
Community College. A preferential transfer is a transfer by
a debtor to a creditor occurring within sixty days of
bankruptcy while the debtor is insolvent and which enables
the creditor to receive more than it would have through a
Chapter 7 liquidation. Although the Court in Seminole Tribe
had held that Congress could not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of a State by Article I legislation, it carved out
an exception in the case of preferential transfers in
bankruptcy. In 1787, various states had bankruptcy laws
generally providing that a debtor could receive a discharge
upon turning over all his property to the bankruptcy
trustee. A problem arose in that some debtors who had
surrendered all their property and received a discharge of
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their debts then suffered imprisonment by other states for
debt. Some states refused to extend comity (legal
recognition) to bankruptcy discharges of other states. The
Constitution provided for the establishment of a federal
bankruptcy system that would be uniform throughout the
United States and avoid the problem of one state not
extending comity to the bankruptcy laws of another.
Congress implemented the first permanent federal bankruptcy
law in 1898. However the majority, in an Opinion written by
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices O’Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer believed that history taught
an intent on the part of the founders to waive state
sovereign immunity in this circumstance. The states waived
immunity by ratifying the Constitution or joining the
Union. The argument made was almost the same as the
prevailing one in Union Gas, but involved the bankruptcy
laws rather than the Commerce Clause. Justice O’Connor, in
one of her last cases before retirement, switched sides and
joined the liberal wing of the Court in this instance.
Justice Thomas dissented joined by Justices Roberts,
Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Thomas was not impressed by
the argument that the framer’s intended to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases stating: “The
majority's action today ... is difficult to comprehend.
85

Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the
Constitution indicates that the Bankruptcy Clause, in
contrast to all of the other provisions of Article I,
manifests the States' consent to be sued by private
citizens.” 122
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CHAPTER VII. STATES SUED IN ANOTHER STATE’S COURT
In Paulus v. South Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867
(1924) the plaintiff suffered an injury in a coal mine in
North Dakota operated by South Dakota. He sued South Dakota
in a North Dakota state court. The North Dakota Supreme
Court ruled that South Dakota was immune from suit without
its consent.
The United States Supreme Court declined to follow the
precedent of Nathan and Paulus in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410; 99 S.Ct. 1182; 59 L.Ed.2d (1979) in which Nevada was
sued in a California state court for a motor vehicle
accident in California involving a Nevada-owned vehicle on
official business. Nevada lost the case and was ordered to
pay $1,150,000.00. The Court would not extend comity to a
Nevada statute limiting damages to $25,000. In a six to
three decision the United States Supreme Court ruled that
sovereign immunity did not protect Nevada and that
California was not required to extend Full Faith and Credit
to the Nevada statute limiting damages. Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote the majority Opinion joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell. Justice
Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist wrote a
dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger. This
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case at first seems anomalous and inconsistent with the
sovereign immunity rulings of the Rehnquist Court. The main
problem is there is little in the Constitution regulating
the behavior of states towards each other. As the law
stands now, for a state to recognize the sovereign immunity
of another state there must be an agreement, either express
or implied, between them or a voluntary decision by the
forum state to extend comity to the sovereign immunity of
the other state. Prof. Ann Woolhandler has published a
study of the law in this area in which she argues that Hall
was wrongly decided. 123
Chief Justice John Marshall, for a unanimous Court,
decided Indian nations are sovereignties within the United
States in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 8 L. Ed.
25 (1831). Issues of sovereign immunity have arisen with
respect to Indian nations and political subdivisions of
states.
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CHAPTER VIII. INDIAN NATIONS HAVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BUT
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF STATES DO NOT
In United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 309 US
506, 60 S. Ct. 653; 84 L. Ed. 894 (1940) the United States
Supreme Court in an Opinion by Justice Stanley Reed ruled
that Indian nations had sovereign immunity and could not be
sued except as provided by an act of Congress. With respect
to political subdivisions of states such as counties and
municipalities, the rule of sovereign immunity does not
apply.
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 10 S. Ct. 363,
33 L. Ed. 766 (1890) was an action against Lincoln County
to pay bonds and coupons. A unanimous Court in an Opinion
by Justice David Josiah Brewer ruled that Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies only to states themselves and
not their political subdivisions. This was a weak case for
a sovereign immunity defense as Lincoln County did not have
immunity under Nevada state law.
The issue of county immunity was revisited by the
Court in Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Chatham County, 547
U.S. 189, 126 S. Ct. 1689, 164 L. Ed. 2d 367, (2006). In
this case a drawbridge operated by the County fell and
collided with a boat. The Court held, in a unanimous
Opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that the County was not
89

acting as an arm of the state in operating the drawbridge
and was not clothed with immunity from suit.
There is one way in which state sovereign immunity can
be penetrated. This is in an action filed by the United
States.
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CHAPTER IX. THE UNITED STATES CAN SUE A STATE
The United States can sue a state and the state’s
sovereign immunity is not a defense. The first such case
was United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 10 S.Ct.
920; 34 L.Ed. 336 (1890) although the immunity issue was
not raised. In United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621; 12
S.Ct. 488; 36 L.Ed. 285 (1892), Texas asserted the
sovereign immunity defense. The Supreme Court ruled that it
had original jurisdiction of the case. It is settled law
that the United States can sue a state in either state or
federal court and state sovereign immunity is no bar.
The sovereign immunity of the United States has not
been seriously questioned other that by Justice James
Wilson.
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CHAPTER X. THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing indicated in
dicta in Chisholm that the United States had sovereign
immunity. Justice Wilson made it clear that no republican
government, in his opinion, had sovereign immunity. Chief
Justice Marshall in dicta in Cohens v. Virginia said, “the
universally received opinion is that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States.” 124 In
United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286; 11 L.Ed. 977 (1846)
the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that the
United States had sovereign immunity. The United States
could not be sued or ordered to pay court costs without its
consent. This has been the invariable rule ever since.
Sovereign immunity for the federal government is
undoubtedly correct and of a constitutional nature as
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states in relevant
part: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Justice Scalia
dissenting in Union Gas stated
Undoubtedly the Constitution envisions the necessary
judicial means to assure compliance with the
Constitution and laws. But since the Constitution does
not deem this to require that private individuals are
able to bring claims against the Federal Government
for violation of the Constitution or laws, see United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-402 (1976); U.S.
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Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (‘No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law’), it is difficult to see
why it must be interpreted to require that private
individuals be able to bring such claims against the
States. If private initiation of suit against the
offending sovereign as such is essential to
preservation of the structure, it is difficult to see
why it would not be essential at both levels. Indeed
if anything it would seem more important at the
federal level, since suits against the States for
violation of the Constitution or laws can at least be
brought by the Federal Government itself, see United
States v. Mississippi, supra, at 140-141. In providing
federal immunity from private suit, therefore, the
Constitution strongly suggests that state immunity
exists as well.” 125
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CONCLUSIONS
It is indeed hard to fathom why the States and the
Federal government should have different rules with respect
to sovereign immunity. They are equal participants in the
Federal system. The Supreme Court, except in Chisholm, has
consistently ruled that the states have sovereign immunity
although many of the decisions have been by sharply divided
courts. Our history shows that state sovereign immunity was
of constitutional stature from the ratification of the
Articles of Confederation until the present time. The Court
has fashioned an Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence including
state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment has been
interpreted in many ways over the years and has a very
complex and confusing case law. Prof. Jesse H. Choper
commented about the Eleventh Amendment case law as follows:
“The Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has
come in for heavy scholarly criticism. It has been called
unconstitutional, anachronistic, based on discredited legal
principles, and inconsistent with constitutional text,
structure, and history. It is fair to say that, in general,
scholarship in the federal courts area has been critical of
the justifications for the doctrine of state sovereign
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immunity, even in its pre-Rehnquist Court incarnations.” 126
The history of sovereign immunity given early in this
thesis should help to clarify the understanding of this
concept. The future for sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment could be rocky. Justice David Hackett Souter
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer in Alden
says as much,
The resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to
the Lochner era's industrial due process is striking.
The Court began this century by imputing immutable
constitutional status to a conception of economic
self-reliance that was never true to industrial life
and grew insistently fictional with the years, and the
Court has chosen to close the century by conferring
like status on a conception of state sovereign
immunity that is true neither to history nor to the
structure of the Constitution. I expect the Court's
late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal
of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one
being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible,
and probably as fleeting.” 127
Justice Stevens joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer was of the opinion that some recent federalism
decisions of the Court were not entitled to respect,
deference, or stare decisis:
I remain convinced that Union Gas was correctly
decided and that the decision of five Justices in
Seminole Tribe to overrule that case was profoundly
misguided. Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am
unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling
precedent. First and foremost, the reasoning of that
126
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opinion is so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally
inconsistent with the Framers' conception of the
constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to
the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of
this Court. Stare decisis, furthermore, has less force
in the area of constitutional law. ... The kind of
judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole
Tribe, Alden v. Maine, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), and College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627, 144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 119 S.
Ct. 2199 (1999), represents such a radical departure
from the proper role of this Court that it should be
opposed whenever the opportunity arises.” 128
One should hope that the law in this area would
stabilize and be determined by legal rather than political
considerations.
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